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A b s t r a c t  
Estimates of marginal tax rates (MTRs) faced by individual economic agents, 
and for various aggregates of taxpayers, are important for economists testing 
behavioural responses to changes in those tax rates. This paper reports 
estimates of a number of personal marginal income tax rate measures for New 
Zealand since 1907, focusing mainly on the aggregate income-weighted 
average MTRs proposed by Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986) and Barro and 
Redlick (2011). The paper describes the methodology used to derive the 
various MTRs from original data on incomes and taxes from Statistics New 
Zealand Official Yearbooks (NZOYB), and discusses the resulting estimates. 
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1  In t roduc t ion  
A focus on marginal tax rates (MTRs) is ubiquitous among studies of the numerous economic 
outcomes that can be impacted by taxation. The ‘outcomes’ of interest are often at the 
individual taxpayer level; e.g. labour supply choices, personal taxable incomes, consumption-
savings choices, individual welfare costs. The aggregation of these micro-level behaviours in 
response to MTRs into macro-level outcomes has become an important focus of research in 
recent years. It now includes an extensive literature on the impacts of taxation (and public 
expenditure, deficits, etc) on aggregate GDP, national savings, investment, and other macro-
level outcomes.  
The recent global recession in particular has prompted macroeconomists to reconsider the 
effectiveness or otherwise of fiscal stimulus packages on GDP and other macro variables, with 
analysis and evidence on this issue dominating recent debate in the US over the merits of tax 
cuts and stimulus spending. Similarly, for New Zealand, recent tax and spending reforms, 
including changes to key MTRs have implications for net fiscal injections and future fiscal 
deficits. In addition, the literature testing the impacts of fiscal policy on longer-run economic 
growth has increasingly investigated the importance of MTRs faced by different agents and 
types of economic activity, and the impact of exogenous changes in public expenditures.1 
Among the difficulties confronting those macro-level studies are problems measuring the ‘true’ 
marginal tax rates of interest. Lack of suitable data has often meant that ‘implicit’ average tax 
rates are used, obtained using tax revenue data. As a consequence, the endogenous 
relationships among ‘true’ marginal tax rates, tax bases and GDP, which together determine tax 
revenues, become difficult to disentangle. Recently Barro and Redlick (2011) have proposed 
ways to help overcome these endogeneity concerns. Firstly, they estimate multiplier effects on 
US GDP over a long period (1917-2006) and consider both taxes and public spending 
simultaneously. For the latter they use public defence expenditures and expected defence 
expenditures (“defence news”) to help overcome spending endogeneity. This requires a number 
of war episodes to assist with identification. Secondly, on the tax side, following methods 
developed by Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986), they argue that an economy-wide ‘average 
marginal tax rate’ (AMTR) using taxpayer income shares as weights provides a suitable 
marginal tax rate measure to capture the potential aggregate responses of GDP to changes in 
individual personal tax incentives. 
The present paper reports estimates of a number of MTR measures for New Zealand, focusing 
especially on the Barro and Sahasakul AMTRs for personal income taxes. The estimates cover 
around a century of New Zealand’s personal income tax regime, from 1907 to the present. The 
paper contributes to the literature in three main areas. First, we provide a comprehensive time-
series database of various marginal income tax rate variables over more than 100 years. We 
calculate effective marginal income tax rates by adjusting for various additional taxes (social 
security, war taxes etc.) and exemptions. The inclusion of the impact of social welfare benefits 
was beyond the scope of our analysis; however, we have provided a point estimate for 2008.  
Secondly, we extend the limited database on incomes (available from Inland Revenue from 
1981) to include aggregate level income data by income class from 1907 assembled from 
Statistical Yearbooks and other primary sources. Thirdly, we propose a methodology to 
construct a Barro-Sahasakul type measure of AMTRs using the data available for New Zealand. 
                                                                
1  Recent contributions include Lee and Gordon (2005), and Angelopoulos et al. (2007), Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008), Romer and 
Romer (2010), Gemmell et al (2011a,b), Beetsma and Guiliudori (2011), Arnold et al (2011), Ramey (2011). 
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This dataset has the potential to form a useful basis from which to answer a number of 
empirical questions relating to the output and other effects of fiscal policy in New Zealand. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses New Zealand’s personal income tax 
system, putting it in historical perspective. Sub-section 2.1 begins by putting the income tax in 
the context of New Zealand’s overall revenue-raising regime of which income taxation was 
initially only a small part. Secondly, since a number of tax rate definitions are used throughout 
the paper, sub-section 2.2 introduces those definitions, including the Barro-Sahasakul AMTR 
measure. In view of the important role of income-weighting in the AMTR measure, section 3 
introduces the available income data and its distribution across income classes over the period. 
Section 4 then describes the methodology used to construct the AMTR series for New Zealand, 
and section 5 presents and discusses the AMTR results. 
2  Persona l  Income Taxat i on  
This section first shows how income taxation has evolved within the New Zealand tax system 
since the beginning of the twentieth century, introduces a number of marginal tax rate 
definitions used later in the paper, and discusses some key historical aspects of the New 
Zealand income tax system that affect calculations of the various MTR measures.  
2 .1  Sources of  Government  Revenue 
Over the course of New Zealand’s fiscal history the sources of government revenue have 
changed as the economy has developed and the role of government increased. While taxation 
is only one source of government revenue, it is the most important, though the proportions of 
expenditure financed by taxes, charges for services and borrowing have varied considerably 
over the years.  
The composition of tax revenue has changed significantly over the last century. In the early 
colonial period it was based heavily on customs and excise duties; these accounted for more 
than 90 percent of tax revenue in 1875-76, with the balance being provided by stamp duties. 
Excise duties were charged on commodities such as alcohol, tobacco and sugar.
2
 At that stage 
in New Zealand’s history customs duty acted similarly to a general sales tax on commodities 
since a very high proportion of commodities was imported.  
In the last years of the nineteenth century taxation was extended into two new areas: an excise 
on beer, and taxes on land and property. Customs and excise duties remained the predominant 
source of revenue, but from 1891 income was introduced as a new tax base in the Land and 
Income Tax Act. Nevertheless, during the early part of the twentieth century the government 
continued to rely on customs and excise duties for revenue, and it was not until the on-set of the 
First World War (WWI) that income taxes began to contribute a substantial share of total 
revenues. 
These trends can be seen in Figure 1 which shows the changing composition of the tax revenue 
base from 1903 to 2011.3 Taxes are split into customs and excise duties, personal income tax, 
                                                                
2 See Goldsmith (2008) for data on tax revenue shares during the nineteenth century from 1840. 
3 The figure uses data from several different sources. From 1903 to 1949 data is taken from New Zealand Official Yearbooks. These did not 
include categories for company tax or sales tax. From 1950 to 1979 data is from the New Zealand Planning Council (1979) and included 
company and sales tax. From 1980 to 2011 data is taken from New Zealand Official Yearbooks and the Government’s Financial 
Statements.  
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company income tax, land tax, estate and gift duties, and ‘other taxes’.
4
 Note that data on the 
revenue share of sales and company taxes is not available before 1950. The Figure shows that 
over an extended period, the share of customs and excise duties fell - from 74% of tax revenue 
in 1903 to 7% in 2011. The largest falls were associated with WWI, the early 1930s depression 
and around World War II (WWII). 
Land tax also fell from a high of around 15% of revenue in 1910 to close to zero by the 1940s, 
with the largest declines occurring in the 1930s as ‘other taxes’ became more important. Estate 
and gift duties similarly became less significant over time, making up only 1% of tax revenue by 
1979 and 0% by 2011. The first broad-based sales tax was introduced in 1933, at 5% of the 
value of the goods sold.  
Figure 1 – Government tax revenue by source, 1903 – 2011 
 
There was a large increase in the revenue share of personal income tax over the period, rising 
from 6% of total taxation in 1903 to 67% by 1981, before falling to 46% in 2011. Not 
surprisingly, WWI brought about a substantial increase in the personal income tax share with 
some of this being reigned back again in the 1920s. The further boost to the income tax 
associated with WWII (when the income tax share reached around 45%) appears to have been 
followed by a fairly steady increase in the personal income tax share, largely at the expense of 
customs and excise duties. 
Income taxes continued to increase as a proportion of government revenue in the post-war 
period until the early 1980s. A large part of this increase was as a result of fiscal drag. Pay As 
You Earn (PAYE) was introduced for income tax in 1958 which reduced the administrative 
burden of income taxes. The 1980s then saw a reduction in the reliance on income tax for 
government revenue, especially in association with the mid-to-late 1980s reforms.  
Sales taxes increased to fill the gap: a comprehensive goods and services tax (GST) was 
introduced in 1986, initially at 10%, subsequently increased to 12.5% in 1989 and, more 
                                                                
4 Other taxes included: motor vehicle frees and road user charges, withholding taxes, gaming duties and entertainment taxes. 
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recently, to 15% in 2010. As a result the sales tax/GST share rose from around 10% of revenue 
in 1986 to 26% by 2000. 
In common with many other OECD countries, the size of New Zealand’s tax revenue as a 
proportion of GDP has also increased markedly since the early 19th century. In 1900 tax 
revenues were approximately 8% of GDP. They rose to 28% of GDP during WWII and to a high 
of 37% in 2006. Currently tax revenues make up around 29% of GDP.  
2 .2  Tax Rate Def in i t ions 
This sub-section defines the key tax rates used in this paper. At the individual taxpayer level 
most personal income tax systems specify a ‘schedule’ of statutory marginal tax rates (MTRs) 
that describe the increase in tax liability associated with an additional dollar of income across 
different income ranges.
5
 In typical progressive income tax systems these statutory MTRs rise 
in ‘steps’ with income. 
Effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) refer to the de facto increase in tax liability associated with 
increases in incomes. These are affected by both the statutory MTR and other aspects of the 
tax code, such as eligible deductions against tax, that affect the taxpayer’s tax liability as 
income rises. Common examples are the withdrawal of tax exemptions or social welfare 
payments in association with changes in income, and additional taxes (such as supplementary 
‘war taxes’) that are related to income tax liabilities. The EMTRs reported in this paper do not 
take into account the impact of withdrawal of social welfare payments, but they do include the 
impact of tax exemptions and additional taxes. 
As we discuss below, the New Zealand income tax and transfer system has at various times: (i) 
set different marginal tax rates for earned and unearned income; (ii) used income-tested 
exemptions, benefits and rebates, such as Family Tax Credits; and (iii) adopted additional 
income-related taxes such as social security tax and tax deductions associated with family-
owned trusts or companies. In addition, legislative changes to levels of tax-exempt income, 
even where these exemptions are not directly income-related, can nevertheless move 
taxpayers into different income tax brackets, and hence the EMTRs that they face, on a given 
gross (pre-exemptions) income. 
Consider a simple tax schedule with only one (non-zero) marginal tax rate, t1, and where no tax 
is liable on incomes below an initial tax-exempt level, a, such that:  
 T(y) = t1[y – a], for y > a (1) 
where t1 is the statutory marginal tax rate, T is total tax paid on income, y, and a is the tax 
exempt income level. If, in addition, the level of the tax-exempt income, a, is reduced at rate v 
per unit of income as income rises above ya (where ya > a), then, for y > ya, the effective 
marginal rate is given by t1 + v, until a = 0. Further, for given income levels, a decision to 
increase the level of a that leads to y < a, will reduce the taxpayer’s EMTR from t1 to zero. The 
individual’s average tax rate (ATR) for the schedule in (1) is then given by: 
 T(y)/y = t1[y – a)]/y for y > a. (2) 
Hence the ATR in (2) must be less than the marginal rate, t1, if a > 0. An equivalent effective 
average tax rate (EATR) - that takes into account any transfer payments (‘negative taxes’) 
received - can also be lower than the ATR, depending on the size of the transfers received 
relative to the individual’s income level. 
                                                                
5  The legal and economic issues surrounding the definition and measurement of ‘income’ for tax purposes are not explored here. 
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Where individual or household level data are available it is common practice to use effective 
marginal or average tax rates of personal income tax to test for behavioural responses. These 
can generally be calculated from tax schedule and other information of the sort described 
above. When working at the aggregate level, however, the choice of an aggregate equivalent to 
individual marginal tax rates is not straightforward and, empirically, is often limited by data 
availability. 
A commonly used aggregate tax rate is the so-called ‘implicit’ average tax rate, R/Y or IATR, 
based on data for aggregate tax revenue (R) and an aggregate income measure (Y). A 
marginal equivalent, or dR/dY, is also sometimes calculated. These ‘implicit’ rates are widely 
recognised as unsatisfactory proxies for their conceptual equivalents, but are readily calculated 
from generally available data. As Myles (2009b, p.34) notes such an aggregate average or 
constructed marginal rate “probably does not [reflect] the rate that any particular economic 
decision maker is facing”. This is because the IATR is likely to include changes in the income 
tax base in response to the ‘true’ EMTR, and hence the IATR measure is not independent of 
income. Such independence is required to reliably measure the response of income to an 
exogenous marginal tax rate change. 
However, Barro-Sahasakul (1983) established the conditions under which aggregate 
equivalents of individual MTRs can be constructed from individual values. They showed that the 
correct form of aggregation depends on how taxes affect consumption, and the question of 
interest. For example, is the investigator interested in the response of income, or of 
consumption, or of something else, to changes in marginal tax rates? They show that a 
consumption-share weighted aggregate of individual MTRs provides the correct aggregation of 
individual MTRs, under certain assumptions about individual’s utility functions.6 Empirically, 
since individual income data are more readily available than consumption data, they propose an 
(individual) income-weighted average as a proxy.
7
 It is this income-weighted average marginal 
tax rate (hereafter labelled ‘AMTR’), that we focus on below; see Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 
pp.426-7) for more details. 
In later sections we present evidence for New Zealand on the Barro and Sahasakul income-
weighted AMTRs from 1907 (the earliest date for relevant income data). We also report data on 
the top statutory MTR, and the top EMTR taking account of other taxes added to, or abated with 
respect to, the personal income tax. First, since the nature of the personal income tax structure 
has changed substantially over the years, the next sub-section outlines some of its key 
features. 
2 .3  The New Zealand Personal  Income Tax 
When the New Zealand income tax was first introduced it took the standard multi-step structure 
in which a set of statutory MTRs are applied across ranges of income covering hundreds or 
thousands of pounds.
8
 Between 1914 and 1939 various other elements were added to the tax 
schedule whereby, in addition to these ‘steps’, tax rates were increased - by tiny fractions of a 
pound - for every additional pound earned. This had a substantial impact on effective MTRs. 
We discuss each system in turn below. 
                                                                
6 For some purposes, such as measuring tax impacts on employment or unemployment, a taxpayer-weighted aggregation may be more 
appropriate. 
7 This consumption or income weighting can be based on a geometric, rather than arithmetic, mean if consumption or income responses to tax 
rates are expected to take a constant elasticity form. 
8 The New Zealand currency was the NZ Pound till 1967; thereafter the NZ Dollar (converted at $2=£1). The Pound (£) was composed of 20 
Shillings (s), with each shilling equal to 12 Pence (d); i.e. £1 = 240d. 
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2 . 3 . 1  The  ea r l y  ye ar s :  1892- 1913  
Income tax was introduced in New Zealand in 1892 with a simple three rate structure: 0% for 
incomes below £300, 2.5% for incomes in the range £300-1,000 and 5% for incomes in excess 
of £1,000.9 This simplicity lasted until 1909; as Table 1 shows, complexity soon set in with a set 
of ten marginal rates introduced in 1910 including a top rate of 5.8%. 
Table 1 – Income tax rates, 1910-1912 
Annual Income 
range (in £) 
Tax rate 
(%)* 
Annual Income 
range (in £) 
Tax rate 
(%)* 
Less than 300 0 801 - 900 4.2 
301 - 400 2.5 901 - 1,000 4.6 
401 - 600 2.9 1,001 - 1,250 5.0 
601 - 700 3.3 1,250 – 2,000 5.4 
701 - 800 3.8 Over 2,000 5.8 
* Quoted in the tax code in shillings and pence per pound of income 
This structure involves the now familiar ‘multi-step tax function’ in which the marginal tax rate 
(MTR) is changed in discrete ‘steps’ at a set of thresholds covering ranges of income levels – 
usually, as here, involving progressively rising steps at higher income ranges – but is constant 
between thresholds. Formally, the multi-step income tax function, with a tax-free income 
exemption, can be written as: 
T(y) = 0  0< y ≤ a1 
= t1(y − a1)  a1 < y ≤ a2 
= t1(a2 − a1) +t2 (y − a2) a2 < y ≤ a3 (3) 
and so on, where t and a are the statutory tax rates and income thresholds respectively. 
2 . 3 . 2  The  mu l t i - s l ope  tax  syst em:  1914 - 1939  
The structure in (3) was the structure of the NZ personal income tax system prior to 1914 and 
from 1940. However, from 1914-1939 the tax schedule involved an increasing tax rate for every 
additional pound of income. To distinguish it, we refer to this below as a ‘multi-slope tax 
function’ since it involves an upwardly sloping marginal rate function between different income 
thresholds. In New Zealand it typically applied to incomes in excess of an initial threshold 
income level (i.e. a1 in (3) above) and, as an individual’s income increased, the higher rate 
applied to all income (above an initial exemption where applicable), not just the increment; see  
Vosslamber (2009, p. 304). Thus the apparent marginal rate in the schedule did not specify the 
‘effective’ marginal rate since an additional pound of income brought with it an additional tax 
liability on that pound and all previous pounds above the initial exemption level. In addition, from 
1917, this initial exemption level was abated (withdrawn) at £1 for every additional £1 of income 
                                                                
9  Tax rates were expressed as shillings (s) and pence (p) per pound (£) of income, where there were 12 pence per shilling and 20 shillings 
per pound. Hence 2.5% = 6p/£ and 5% = 1s/£. New Zealand’s currency was decimalised (to the NZ dollar) in 1967. 
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in excess of £600, further adding to the ‘true’ marginal rate over this income range.10 This 
system is described in more detail in Appendix 1. 
2 . 3 . 3  O the r  as pe ct s  o f  Ne w Zea l and’ s  income tax  s t ruct ur e  
It is not possible here to catalogue the numerous changes to the income tax system from 1907 
to the present, but a number of milestones in the evolution of the New Zealand income tax 
structure are worth noting. Those of relevance to AMTR estimates include: 
i. The introduction of various exemptions in addition to the ‘general exemption’. These 
included exemptions for children and other dependents and a life insurance exemption 
(see Appendix 3 for details). 
ii. The distinction made between earned and unearned income from 1921 to 1950.11 A 
10% discount on earned income (up to £2000) was in place until 1930, followed 
subsequently by a one-third tax surcharge on unearned income. 
iii. A drop in tax rates in the mid-1920s after the WWI ‘temporary’ increases (see Figure 2). 
iv. The introduction of a social security tax in 1931 at 1.25%, rising to 12.5% in 1943, then 
reduced to 7.5% in 1947 and abolished in 1970. 
v. The introduction, also in 1931, of an ‘additional tax’ levy, at 30% of the individual’s 
income tax liability. The additional tax was removed in 1936 but re-introduced for 1939-
1953. Over the latter period the rate varied subsequently between 2.5% and 33.3%.12 
vi. The large increase in EMTRs during WWII with the top rate statutory rate rising to 60%, 
and a top EMTR approaching 100% (inclusive of social security and special war taxes).  
vii. The replacement of the multi-slope income tax schedule with a multi-step function of 
MTRs in 1940 but with 40 separate rates/steps and a maximum statutory rate of 60%. 
viii. Generally lower top statutory rates after WWII until the mid-1970s. 
ix. Rises in top statutory MTRs to the mid-1980s followed by the sharp drop associated with 
the 1980s reforms. 
Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of the top effective marginal tax rate over the period, 
including the statutory top personal income tax rate plus the ‘additional tax’ component and the 
social security tax. For the period where the multi-slope function applied, its impact on EMTRs 
is also shown. 
The impact of the ‘additional’ and social security taxes on individual EMTRs is rather different. 
The relevant expression for an individual’s tax liability can be written as: 
T(y) = τ(y – a) + βTI(y) = τ(1 + β )(y – a) (4) 
Where τ is the statutory or effective marginal income tax rate, β is the rate of ‘additional tax’ 
which is applied to the income tax liability, TI, where TI(y)  = τ(y – a). The effective marginal tax 
rate on income therefore becomes τ(1 + β ). Letting the marginal social security tax rate be s, 
the effective marginal tax rate, EMTR, of all taxes combined is composed as follows: 
EMTR = s + τ + βτ (5) 
                                                                
10  This abatement regime operated from 1917 to 1926. Two other abatement regimes were in place from 1927-1930 and 1931-1935. More 
details are in Appendix 3. A supplementary ‘special war tax’ was also introduced during 1917-20 which effectively applied a multiplier of 
1.3333 to all tax rates (e.g. 6% becomes 8%). 
11  Earned income was defined as income earned by a taxpayer through physical exertion (largely salary and wage income), whereas, 
unearned income relates to passive sources of income such as interest, or rental income. 
12  There had also been a similarly calculated ‘discount’ during 1923-24 at 20%. 
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Here βτ captures the EMTR impact of the ‘additional tax’ levied on the overall income tax 
liability. 
Figure 2 shows how both the social security tax and the additional tax substantially increased 
effective rates around the WWII period with the additional tax being phased out in the mid-
1950s. The social security tax was retained till the late-1960s. For four years during WWII the 
combined effect of all three taxes produces a top EMTR in excess of 90%: a top IT = 60%; 
additional tax = 20% (i.e. legislation set β = 0.33 in those years) and SST = 12.5%. 
During the 1920s-30s, the impact of the multi-slope tax schedule on top EMTRs was also 
substantial, often adding around 15-20 percentage points to those specified in the tax schedule. 
These high effective rates typically applied at high, but not the highest, income levels (see 
Appendix 1). In 1923 and 1924 there was a 20% discount on the tax bill, resulting in net a top 
EMTR of 44%.   
Figure 2 – Top effective marginal tax rates for New Zealand, 1907-2009* 
  
*  Tax rates shown include social security taxes and relate to earned income where relevant. 
Finally, for much of the period studied the amount of tax that individuals paid was also 
dependent on the amount of exemptions received, which reduced their average tax rates. 
These can affect individuals’ effective marginal tax rates directly when they are abated with 
rising incomes, as discussed above, and indirectly by affecting the number of income earners 
liable to tax, their assessable income and hence the statutory marginal tax rates applicable for a 
given gross income. They therefore would shift some individuals across tax brackets and affect 
economy-wide AMTRs as discussed in section 4. 
3  New Zea land  Income D is t r ibu t ion  Data  
To calculate aggregate level AMTRs requires suitable income distribution data to enable the 
income-weights to be generated. Income distribution data used here for the purpose of 
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estimating AMTRs have largely been sourced from the New Zealand Official Yearbooks 
(NZOYB), which in turn were sourced from income tax returns filed with Inland Revenue. We 
have been able to identify data from the early 1900s through to the early 1980s and over this 
period the data presented in the NZOYBs have evolved. Income data were not separately 
sourced after the early 1980s. Instead we have utilised AMTRs estimated from more reliable 
unit record data by Inland Revenue for the period 1981-2009, and we examine a three year 
overlap as a cross-check on the alternative approaches. 
3 .1  Income Data  
There are three important aspects to the income distribution data for our purposes: 
1. how income is distributed across the tax brackets/rates for which we have tax schedule 
information; 
2. how exemptions against tax are distributed across income levels and tax brackets; and 
3. how far NZOYB income distribution data, generally only available for tax filers until the 
PAYE regime from 1958, can be supplemented to capture non-filers’ incomes. 
We assembled NZOYB income data on individual taxpayers (for example, wage and salary 
earners, and self employed), but excluding companies. We focus on the distribution of income 
for aggregate gross income (before exemptions), aggregate earned and unearned income, and 
income tax exemptions.13 We also used data on the number of tax returns filed to estimate the 
size of non-filed income (see below). 
Of course, available income and tax data vary in quality and coverage over the period of the 
personal income tax, and we have found no suitable income data prior to 1907. Appendix 2 
discusses the nature and quality of the income data over various sub-periods during 1907-1983, 
highlighting the main methods and assumptions adopted.  
Figure 3 provides an example of how the income distribution data are organised, in this case for 
1925. It shows total assessable income, not numbers of taxpayers, on the vertical axis, with 
income classes on the horizontal, where the class widths are not standardised. The distribution 
of gross assessable income is shown with separate histograms for total, and earned, income. 
Where tax brackets do not coincide with the relevant income classes, aggregate income within 
the income class is divided on a pro rata basis to allow each segment to be taxed at the 
appropriate rate. Note that the spike in income in bracket 1,000-1,999 is due to the larger size 
of this and subsequent brackets.  
In 1925, earned income below a certain threshold was taxed at a lower rate compared to 
unearned income (applicable through the first half of the 20th century). In addition, certain 
income was exempt from tax depending on a taxpayer’s circumstances. Data on tax 
exemptions, distributed by size of income, first appeared in the NZOYB in this period and are 
described further in Appendix 3. 
  
                                                                
13  The NZOYB also has data on taxable income (i.e. gross income less exemptions), income tax assessed, and similar measures of income 
and tax for companies. The NZOYB ceased publishing final income data from 1973, though provisional estimates of income were 
included. Instead, for the 1970s and early 1980s we source income and exemption data from the separate SNZ Report on Incomes and 
Income Tax. 
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Figure 3 – Distribution of total and earned assessable income, 1925 
 
3 .2  Exempt ions Data 
Until the 1970s exemption of some income from personal income tax was a feature of the New 
Zealand tax system. A portion of income was exempt from tax for a specified set of 
circumstances, including: low income (the ‘general exemption’), and exemptions for 
child/dependent, wife/spouse, housekeeper and insurance (related to life insurance and 
superannuation fund contributions). This had the effect of reducing individuals’ tax liabilities, for 
given gross income, depending on their individual circumstances, thereby affecting their 
average tax rates. It directly affected their effective marginal tax rates to the extent that 
exemptions were income-dependent (e.g. were withdrawn in association with increasing 
income). It would also have affected the relevant statutory tax rate where exemptions shifted a 
taxpayer between MTR bands. In Appendix 3 we describe the exemptions data further and 
section 4 below discusses how we use data on the distribution of exemptions by income levels 
in the AMTR calculations. 
3 .3  Non-Fi ler  Incomes 
A major omission from NZOYB income data is the income of individuals who were not required 
to file tax returns, prior to the introduction of PAYE in 1958. Non-filers were generally those with 
incomes below the low-income ‘general exemption’ threshold since those with incomes above 
this level were legally required to file a return. Appendix 4 describes the methods we use to 
estimate the income of non-filers. While omission of these non-filers with a zero EMTR would 
not be a problem for calculations of a tax-share weighted estimate of the aggregate AMTR, it is 
potentially important for an income-weighted average. Ignoring non-filers would risk over-
estimating the AMTR. 
In brief, our method of estimating non-filers’ income involves using census data for 1926, 1936, 
1945 and 1951 and labour market data to derive estimates of total personal incomes which can 
be compared with our NZOYB data on filers’ total personal incomes. One option would be to 
interpolate between census years using the ratio of filer-to-all personal incomes. This ratio 
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reveals an increasing trend, rising from 0.347 (for 1926) to 0.707 (1936), 0.919 (1945) and 
0.963 (1951). 
However, evidence from Barro and Sahasakul (1983) suggests that, while this ratio tends to 
trend up over time in association with rising income levels, it can be especially low during short-
run recessionary periods. Within our dataset, this includes the 1920s-30s depression when 
large falls in personal incomes reduced the numbers of those required to file. Data on GNP are 
available throughout our period of interest, and this could be expected to capture recessionary 
impacts. 
We therefore estimate the ratio of total personal income, Y, to GNP in Census years 
(subscripted ‘c’), Yc,/GNPc, and use interpolated (subscripted ‘i’) values of this ratio, and annual 
GNP values, to estimate values of Yi for non-Census years. Together with our estimates for 
total income of filers, Y(F)i, for those years we can estimate non-filers incomes, Y(N), in non-
Census years as Y(N)i = Yi - Y(F)i. The resulting time-series for the ratio of filers-to-total 
income, and the decomposition of total income into filer/non-filer categories, are shown in 
Appendix 4, Figures A3 and A4 respectively. These suggest a plausible but fluctuating fall in the 
extent of non-filers’ incomes, reaching less than 4% of total personal incomes by 1951. 
4  Ca lcu la t ing  AMTRs –  Methodo logy  
4.1 Apply ing the Barro-Sahasakul  Approach 
As noted in the introduction, the AMTR of interest here is the Barro and Sahasakul (1983) 
income-weighted average of individual effective marginal personal income tax rates. That is, we 
want to estimate the aggregate: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =��YjY�EMTRj𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=0  
 
(6) 
where Yj is the personal income of taxpayer j, and Y is aggregate personal income across all j 
taxpayers. The EMTRjs are obtained from the tax schedule or suitably adjusted ‘effective’ rates 
where those differ from statutory rates. The relevant tax rates and thresholds are then matched 
with information on (Yj/Y) from our income distribution data, inclusive of the income share of 
non-filing taxpayers. To avoid confusion, in the remainder of the paper we refer to marginal tax 
rates (MTR, EMTR) levied at the individual level using the subscript j; hence: MTRj, EMTRj. 
Applying equation (6) to our data requires a number of simplifying assumptions. Firstly, from 
1981-2009 the use of taxpayer unit record data ensures that the relevant MTRj or EMTRj of 
income tax is identified for each taxpayer. However, like the pre-1981 data, this dataset does 
not include the impact on EMTRjs of abatement of social welfare payments. 
For data prior to 1981, we seek to match data from NZOYB and other sources on the 
distribution of gross assessable income with the relevant tax schedule. Since tax brackets are 
typically described with respect to net-of-exemptions assessable income, it is important to 
subtract those exemptions to identify net income and thereby the appropriate EMTRj to apply at 
each gross income level. For many taxpayers, the deduction of exemptions from their gross 
income will not alter their MTRj or EMTRj (e.g. deduction of $5000 from gross income of 
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$50,000 will not affect the MTRj where this MTRj applies over a net income band of $40,000-
50,000. However, another taxpayer with the same $50,000 of gross income but $12,000 
exemptions would face a different MTRj  - that applicable to net income below $40,000. 
We therefore need to deduct exemptions from gross (assessable) income to derive net 
(assessable) income in order to identify the relevant MTRj or EMTRj for each taxpayer. 
However, with aggregate-level, rather than individual-level, gross assessable income and 
exemptions data by gross income band, we do not know how many taxpayers (and associated 
fraction of gross income) would face a lower marginal tax rate than would be inferred from their 
gross income. 
Treating our aggregate-level data as if they represented an individual within each income band 
would mean that either all or no income would shift MTRj bands as a result of adjusting for 
exemptions. Instead we (i) assume that the impact of exemptions is to move individuals by no 
more than one MTRj band; and (ii) use the ratio of total exemptions to gross assessable income 
in each band to weight the MTRjs for each band, m. This yields an EMTRj estimate reflecting 
the exemptions adjustment: 
EMTRj,m = (em/ym) MTRj,m-1 + (1 - em/ym) MTRj,m  (7) 
Where (em/ym) is the exemptions/income ratio in band m, and MTRj,m (MTRj,m-1) is the MTRj in 
band m (m-1), (m > 0) and MTRj,0 = 0, captures the general personal exemption. To examine 
the sensitivity of our AMTR calculations to this assumption, we also report AMTRs where no 
shifts in MTR brackets, based on exemptions data, has been assumed. 
4 .2  Examples of  AMTR calcu la t ions 
Table 2 shows an example of the AMTR calculations – for the 1980 income year – when there 
were relatively few (six) income tax brackets and MTRjs. Since the income tax schedule defines 
taxable income as income net of exemptions (deductions), the income brackets in row 1 are 
defined with respect to net income. 
Table 2 – The AMTR calculations, 1980 
1. Taxable income 
bracket ($) <4,500 
4,500-
10,000 
10,000-
11,000 
11,000-
16,000 
16,000-
22,000 >22,000 Total 
2. Statutory MTR 14.5% 36.5% 41.5% 48.0% 55.0% 60.0%  
3. EMTR 13.5% 35.2% 41.2% 47.6% 54.6% 59.8%  
4. Gross assess-able income 1,225,465 4,565,695 991,170 3,550,580 1,583,880 1,304,220 13,221,010 
5. Exemptions 85,775 275,315 66,130 235,960 90,860 45,870 799,910 
6. income share (%) 9% 35% 7% 27% 12% 10% 100% 
 Income-weighted AMTR = 41.70% 
The MTRj  for each income bracket is shown in row 2. Row 3 provides an estimate of the 
EMTRj faced by individuals in each tax bracket, adjusted for the impact of exemptions.14 This 
adjustment weights the MTRjs in each bracket by the ratios of exempt income (row 5) to gross 
income (row 4). For example, approximately 7% of income in the <4,500 bracket in 1980 was 
exempt from tax; we therefore assume that this fraction of income faces the MTRj of the bracket 
immediately below; in this case, 0%. In view of the small amount of exemptions (averaging 6% 
of gross income), the resulting impacts on the 1979/80 EMTRs in row 3 are small. 
                                                                
14  Note that this is not an EMTR as conventionally defined since no individual faces this rate. Rather it reflects the weighted average of rates 
faced by taxpayers in that, and the adjacent, income brackets. 
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The relevant gross income shares are calculated in row 6. In principle, non-filer income is also 
added before estimating the gross income shares in row 6 though, as noted above, this is not 
relevant after 1958. Applying the row 6 weights to the EMTRjs in row 3 yields the AMTR 
(=41.70%) for 1980. It can be seen that this is dominated by the large shares (nearly 65%) of 
income in the $4.5-10k and $11-16k income brackets facing EMTRjs of 35.2% and 47.6% 
respectively. 
The case in Table 2 illustrates a relatively straightforward year. Most years, however, involve 
multiple marginal tax rates across income levels and a variety of additional complications 
including: 
i. earned and unearned income distinctions (1921-50) with each facing different MTRjs15 
ii. estimation of EMTRjs where statutory rates do not measure effective rates; e.g. 
separate non-filer incomes and abatement of thresholds 
iii. The multi-slope tax function where EMTRjs rise with every pound of income (1914-39); 
in that case we calculate AMTRs based on EMTRjs at the mid-points in income classes 
across the income distribution 
iv. income classes from income distribution data that approximate the income bands in the 
tax structure, requiring some re-grouping of data on incomes, exemptions etc. 
v. simultaneous application of several different taxes at various rates to a given income 
including social security taxes, and special ‘war taxes’ 
Figure 4 – Income distribution and tax structure, 1950 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the more complex 1950 income distribution and tax structure. This overlays 
income distribution data with the individual EMTRjs. The rates rise in multiple steps from 4% at 
an income of £200 to 76% at incomes over £4000. This yields the AMTR of 29% shown. 
Exemptions data are used to adjust the EMTRjs to approximate the effect of people moving to 
lower income brackets. This adjustment has a particularly large impact at the bottom of the 
income distribution; for the £200-300 bracket the effective tax rate drops from 21%, before 
                                                                
15  Data on earned incomes was collected until 1956 but earned and unearned income faced the same tax rate from 1951-1956.   
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allowing for exemptions, to 4%. That is, the availability of exemptions shifts a large fraction of 
taxpayers into the 0% tax rate applied to net incomes up to £200. 
5  Income-weighted AMTRs:  1907-2009  
Using the tax structure and income distribution information discussed in previous sections, this 
section discusses the estimated values obtained using the methods described earlier – sub-
section 5.1. Since the relationship between exempt and non-filer incomes is important for these 
calculations, this is discussed in sub-section 5.2. Sub-section 5.3 then uses a decomposition of 
the AMTRs to assess how far changes in tax structure and income levels or its distribution 
account for observed movements in AMTRs over time. 
5 .1  The Overa l l  pat tern of  AMTRs 
The changes in both the tax schedule and income distribution over the period from 1907 to 
2009 have resulted in an AMTR series which varies substantially over the period. Figure 5 
shows two AMTR series. The main series (in black) uses exemptions data to adjust the EMTRjs 
up to 1983, and reports IRD-based calculations from 1981. This series is also given in Table 3. 
A second series ignoring exemptions data (that is, individual EMTRjs are not adjusted using 
exemptions data) is shown in dotted red. 
Both series ranges from 0.4% in 1907, the first year for which income distribution data are 
available, to a maximum of around 47% in 1982. It can be seen that in general the two series 
follow each other closely suggesting that exemptions adjustments play a limited role. The main 
period during which exemptions adjustments have a larger impact is 1954 to 1969. As 
discussed below, this was a period that witnessed a substantial increase in the initial tax-free 
allowance and other exemptions. 
Based on the main series, the AMTR increases during WWI and its aftermath, reaching 5.4% in 
1924. It then drops back to 2-3% in the second half of the decade. Thereafter during the inter-
war period, the AMTR rises especially during the years of the Great Depression from 1929, 
reaching a maximum of 7.4% in 1933. 
The most significant increase in the AMTR over the century, however, occurs at the beginning 
of WWII where the rate jumps from 11% in 1939 to 21% in 1940. The AMTR continues to rise 
thereafter to reach a local maximum of 30% in 1945. Though the AMTR drops in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, the lower AMTRs over the remainder of the decade are short-lived with an 
increase to 32% by 1951. Changes to the tax system from 1939 to 1953 were largely enacted 
through the use of additional war-related income taxes, ranging from an additional 2.5% to 33% 
added to individuals’ final income tax bills. These had the administrative advantage of raising 
extra revenue without needing to adjust the basic income tax schedule; see Vosslamber (2009). 
After WWII the AMTR appears to follow a fairly steady upward trend till 1982, interrupted by two 
substantial declines: in 1961 and in 1971-3. Both declines largely reflect tax structure, mainly 
rate, changes but whereas the 1971-3 rate reductions mainly involved declines in top rates (see 
Figure 2), the 1961 case primarily reflected cuts in lower tax rates and increased exemptions. 
Both reductions in AMTRs were soon reversed, with exemptions subsequently curtailed in the 
mid-1960s, and the removal of the general personal exemption plus increased MTRjs in 1975 
as the early 1970s oil crisis hit. Section 5.3 discusses the decomposition of AMTR changes in 
more detail. 
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Figure 5 – AMTRs for New Zealand 1907-2009 
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Table 3 – Average marginal tax rates (in percent), 1907-2009 
 
Year AMTR (%) Year AMTR (%) Year AMTR (%) 
1907                 0.4  1941               21.7  1975               39.3  
1908                   -    1942               27.3  1976               39.9  
1909                   -    1943               27.8  1977               38.5  
1910                 0.4  1944               27.7  1978               43.3  
1911                   -    1945               30.2  1979               42.1  
1912                 0.5  1946               25.4  1980               41.7  
1913                   -    1947               24.4  * 1981               42.6  
1914                 0.5  1948               26.3  1982               44.6  
1915                   -    1949               27.1  1983               40.9  
1916                   -    1950               28.7  1984               35.9  
1917                 3.0  1951               32.0  1985               37.5  
1918                   -    1952               29.8  1986               40.4  
1919                   -    1953               30.1  1987               38.6  
1920                 4.5  1954               29.5  1988               35.8  
1921                   -    1955               30.1  1989               33.0  
1922                 3.7  1956               30.8  1990               29.2  
1923                 4.6  1957               31.5  1991               29.5  
1924                 5.1  1958               32.4  1992               29.5  
1925                 1.9  1959               32.1  1993               29.4  
1926                 2.2  1960               33.3  1994               29.6  
1927                 2.8  1961               26.4  1995               29.7  
1928                 2.6  1962               25.2  1996               29.9  
1929                 3.1  1963               25.8  1997               28.7  
1930                 3.3  1964               27.8  1998               28.3  
1931                 5.5  1965               29.7  1999               27.2  
1932                 7.2  1966               30.5  2000               26.0  
1933                 7.4  1967               31.1  2001               27.6  
1934                 5.8  1968               31.4  2002               28.9  
1935                 5.5  1969               32.4  2003               29.1  
1936                 8.0  1970               32.4  2004               29.7  
1937                 9.6  1971               37.1  2005               30.2  
1938                 8.7  1972               35.9  2006               30.5  
1939               11.3  1973               33.4  2007               30.9  
1940               20.5  1974               34.4  2008               31.3  
    
2009               31.1  
* Data from 1981 are sourced from Inland Revenue 
Following the early 1980s peak around 47%, a substantial decline in the AMTR occurs, in 
part associated with the familiar ’80s reforms, though beginning prior to the main mid-
1980s reform years, and falling to around 30% by 1990. The data also confirm a decline in 
the AMTR during 1996-2000 in association with revenue-reducing tax reforms (e.g. the 
lowest MTRj fell from 24% in 1994 to 19.5% in 2000, and thresholds were raised). This 
was followed by a steady rise in the AMTR (from 26% in 2000 to 31% in 2008) following 
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the increase in the top MTRj from 33% to 39% in 2000, and the resulting impact of fiscal 
drag thereafter as income tax thresholds remained fixed in nominal terms.16 
Comparing the two series in Figure 5 reveals the impact of our ‘exemptions adjustment’ 
designed to capture the effect of general exemptions reducing net, relative to gross, 
income. As noted above, for an (unknown) fraction of taxpayers, this would reduce the 
statutory marginal tax rate that they faced. It can be seen that the adjustment has little 
effect on estimated AMTRs except for the early 1940s, 1954-58 and 1961-69. For the first 
two period AMTRs are reduced by about 1-2 percentage points (ppt); during 1961-69 the 
difference in the series ranged from almost 5 ppt (1962) to 2.4 ppt in 1969. In each of 
these cases tax structure changes in 1940, 1954 and 1962 involved an increase in the 
initial income level liable to the 0% marginal tax rate, hence affecting the fraction of 
taxpayers who may face a lower MTRj. Year-to year changes in the two series are 
however largely unaffected by the adjustments. 
Finally, the AMTR calculations described here exclude the impact of ACC levies, the 
Benefit system and the Family Tax Credit (FTC) system which, at various times since the 
1970s, involved lump sum transfers to lower income families with children that were 
withdrawn at higher income levels at rates of up to 30c/$, thereby adding to effective 
MTRjs. The effect of FTCs is discussed further below. 
5 .2  Relat ionships between Exempt ions,  Non-Fi led 
Incomes and AMTRs 
The calculated AMTRs incorporate estimates of the amount of income exempt from tax, 
including income which was not required to be filed with the tax department, and its 
impact on the effective marginal tax rate faced by individuals. Non-filer income is 
effectively treated as being ‘taxed’ at a zero tax rate in our calculations, and this has a 
significant impact in lowering the AMTRs. For exempt income we have sought to capture 
the impact of exemptions in moving people to lower marginal tax brackets as discussed 
above. This had a smaller, but nevertheless noticeable impact, especially where it moves 
some taxpayers into a tax-free income bracket. 
Figure 6 shows how the proportions of exempt and non-filer income changes over the 
1907 to 1982 period. (This is not readily calculated for the post-1982 IRD dataset). During 
the early part of the 20th century, we estimate that a large proportion of income was not 
filed. In 1907, approximately 89% of income was not filed because it fell under the £300 
filing limit. This proportion reduced steadily throughout the first half of the century, and by 
1958 when the PAYE system was introduced it was close to zero. As described above, 
there were a number of tax exemptions available. The proportion of income which was 
exempt from tax is shown in red in Figure 6. By 1980 income exempt from tax represented 
only around 5% of gross assessable income. 
  
                                                                
16  There is very little fiscal drag under similar conditions during 1990-1995 due to the very flat nature of the two-MTRj schedule (at 
24% and 33%) and fixed nominal thresholds in those years. 
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Figure 6 – Proportions of taxed, exempt and non-filed income, 1907 – 1983 
 
5 .3  Decomposing Changes in  the AMTRs 
The variations in the AMTR over the period can be decomposed into changes to the tax 
system, changes in average income levels, and changes to the income distribution. The 
impact of each of these varies across the period. This section attempts to identify the most 
significant impacts in different time periods.  
The AMTRs changed only slightly during the period 1907 – 1916, due to minor changes in 
both tax rates and income distribution. In 1914 the multi-slope scale was introduced. It did 
not have a large impact on the AMTR, however, as the tax rates remained low and there 
were many unaffected non-filers. 
In 1917 effective marginal tax rates were increased substantially (by around 3 times at the 
lower end of the income distribution and up to 8 times at the upper end). The increase 
included the addition of a ‘special war tax’. In addition, abatement of the general 
exemption was introduced. As a result the AMTR increased from 0.5% in 1914 to 3.0% in 
1917. It increased further to 4.5% in 1920, solely as a result of increasing incomes which 
moved people into higher tax brackets (the tax system did not change). From 1922 to 
1924 tax rates were reduced slightly, but the AMTRs continued to rise due to increasing 
incomes shifting the distribution towards higher income tax brackets. 
It was not until 1925, however, that post-WWI tax rates fell more significantly, with the top 
marginal tax rate dropping from 29% in 1924 to 22.5% in 1925. Thereafter the AMTR 
generally rose slowly over the remaining ’20s and ’30s, except for a relatively large rise 
(compared to previously) between 1930 and 1932. This largely reflected tax schedule 
changes in 1931.17 In the same year, total income dropped by 5% and the income 
                                                                
17  For example, the statutory MTRjs were approximately doubled across the income distribution and the tax-free threshold was 
reduced; a 30% additional tax was added to the final tax bill; social security tax was introduced at 1.25%; and a supplementary 
33.33% tax was applied to unearned income. 
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distribution was skewed downwards. The net effect of these changes was an increase in 
the AMTR from 3.3% in 1930 to 5.5% in 1931. 
From the mid-1930s to the early post-WWII years, AMTRs rose rapidly and did so again 
from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s. In between, the roughly 30 year period from the 
mid-1940s to mid-1970s reveals a steady upward trend the AMTRs, punctuated by a brief 
decline from 1951-54 and the sharp fall in 1961-63. 
The especially rapid rise in the lead-up to, and during, WWII largely reflects tax system 
changes: mainly tax rate and threshold changes designed to raise additional revenue. In 
1936 tax rates were increased substantially (the top marginal rate on earned income 
increased from around 43% in 1935 to 65% in 1936), and increased again in 1939 plus an 
“additional tax” at 15% to finance the war effort (War Expenses Act 1939). In 1942 social 
security was increased to 12.5% and the additional tax was increased from 15% to 33.3%. 
Combined with an upward movement in incomes, these changes generated a rise in the 
AMTR to 27% in 1942 and 30% by 1945. 
Unsurprisingly, the sharp drop in the AMTR in 1946 captures the reduction in social 
security and the additional ‘war’ tax to 10% and 15% respectively in the aftermath of the 
war. However, as noted above, upward movements from 1948 are interrupted by 
reductions in 1951-54 and 1961-63. Both appear to arise mainly from legislated increases 
in exemptions. The large drop in 1962-63 reflects both increased generosity of 
exemptions (they rose from 46% of total gross assessable income in 1961, to 56% in 
1963) and across-the-board upward shifts in MTRj thresholds in 1962. 
The upward trend in the AMTR was interrupted briefly in the early-1970s and halted 
sharply in 1982 – well before the major economic and tax reforms of the mid-1980s. As 
with the AMTR declines in 1962-63, the decline in AMTR from 1982-84 is associated with 
increases in the tax thresholds at most income levels (but a new higher top rate) and 
some schedule simplification in 1984. The major reforms involving a reduced top rate did 
not become effective until 1988-89 when the top MTRj was reduced from 66% in 1987 to 
48% in 1988 and 33% in 1989. 
Further insight into the time-series pattern of AMTRs, and the role of different 
components, can be obtained by considering the relationship between personal income 
not subject to income tax and the AMTR. Figure 7 shows cross-plots of the AMTR with the 
estimated income share of non-filers. It also shows the share of income (of filers) that is 
tax-exempt – where the latter is added to the former in Figure 7. Increasing exemptions 
push more taxpayers into tax-free status (when an initial zero tax rate exists) as well as 
reducing positive MTRjs for others. 
The Figure shows the time-series from 1922 (top left corner) to 1983 (bottom right corner) 
with dashed lines joining annual observations.18 The non-filers’ share reaches zero (in 
1958) and therefore tracks the horizontal axis thereafter. The non-filers’ income share 
reveals a clear negatively-sloped, and non-linear, relationship with the AMTR, - the 
correlation with the AMTR is -0.91 (1922-58). The relationship of the AMTR to exemptions 
is more complex. Though the combined ‘non-filers plus exemptions’ share in Figure 8 
reveals a negative slope, for exemptions alone the correlation with the AMTR is +0.76 
(1922-58) but -0.93 (1959-83). That is, as AMTRs generally rose over time, and non-filing 
became less common (to 1958), exemptions tended to replace non-filing as the preferred 
means of keeping tax rates low or zero on lower income earners. After 1958 however, 
when PAYE was introduced, exemptions tend to decline over time in association with 
rising AMTRs. 
                                                                
18  1983 is the last year for which we can conduct this exercise due to the switch to IRD unit record data thereafter. 
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Figure 7 – AMTRs and tax exempt/non-filed income, 1922-1983 
 
Of course, in any given year the share of income that is exempt from tax depends on a 
variety of underlying factors including income growth, tax schedule changes and so on. 
With some years involving tax schedules with many different MTRjs and thresholds, a 
formal decomposition into income changes and tax system changes cannot readily be 
made. However, it is useful to consider year-to-year changes to all non-zero MTRjs in the 
tax schedule since this provides one indicator of changes in the tax structure other than 
exemptions. We take a simple unweighted mean of all non-zero tax rates in the personal 
income tax schedule for each year – using effective marginal rates rather than statutory 
rates.19 These are plotted against the AMTR for 1922-83 in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 – Cross-plot of AMTR and non-zero EMTRj average, 1922-1983 
 
                                                                
19  That is, social security, additional taxes/discounts and exemption adjustments are included. Using statutory rates yields similar 
results. 
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This reveals that the rise in the AMTR occurred largely in association with a rise in the 
‘average’ non-zero MTRj that each individual faced in the tax schedule from around 1931 
(bottom left corner), until around 1942-45 but not thereafter. That is, for the post-WWII 
period, increases in the AMTR are not generally associated with changes to the tax 
schedule that raised MTRjs, though this does not of course preclude changes in 
thresholds that meant a given MTRj applied at higher or lower income levels. In essence, 
by the 1940s, top (and other) MTRs had reached sufficiently high levels, that they tended 
to remain around those levels or fall back in subsequent years. 
Though these broad patterns over several years are revealing they do not indicate the 
extent to which each annual change in the AMTR reflects its various components. To 
apply that here, for the 1907-2009 period, first consider a simplified two-rate step function 
involving two tax rates, t0, t1, where t0 = 0, and t1 > 0. For this simplified case the change 
in the AMTR, dM, can be broken down into: 
dM = w1dt1 + t1dw1 + dt1dw1 + { w0dt0 + t0dw0} (8) 
where w1 is the income weight of taxpayers facing t1 (= 1- w0), and the term in curly 
brackets is zero (t0 = dt0 = 0). The income weights are affected by tax thresholds that 
determine the MTRjs applicable at different taxpayer income levels. Of course the NZ 
personal income tax schedule involves a more complex structure of several (sometimes 
many!) non-zero tax rates. Nevertheless it is useful to approximate the exact specification 
in (8) using the annual ‘unweighted average’ of the non-zero MTRjs, in the schedule, as 
shown in Figure 8. Thus (8) becomes: 
dM = w’1dt’1 + t’1dw’1 + dt’1dw’1 + R (8’) 
where t’ is the simple average of non-zero MTRjs in the schedule, w’ is the income weight 
of all taxpayers facing a non-zero MTRj, and R is a residual – capturing the omitted 
components involving changes in each non-zero MTRs relative to the average t’1, 
changes in associated tax thresholds, and changes in income shares relative to w’1. 
Using (8’) to decompose changes in AMTRs (dM) for each year during 1907-83 gives the 
following correlation matrix where pre- and post-1940 correlations are examined 
separately – Figure 9 suggests a different relationship after around 1940. 
Table 4 – Correlation matrix of AMTR changes 
 1907-40 1941-83 
 w’1dt’1 t’1dw’1 dt’1dw’1 w’1dt’1 t’1dw’1 dt’1dw’1 
t’1dw’1 0.19 - - -0.15 - - 
AMTR 0.85 0.24 0.51 0.34 0.08 0.27 
It can be seen that both changes in the share of taxable in total income, t’1dw’1, and 
changes in ‘average’ non-zero MTRjs, w’1dt’1, are positively correlated with annual 
changes in the AMTR. However changes in the taxable income share have a much 
smaller correlation at 0.24 versus 0.85 (pre-1940) and 0.08 versus 0.34 (post-1940). The 
positive cross-correlation between, w’1dt’1 and t’1dw’1 reveals that this has a larger effect 
on the AMTR than the change in the income weight, t’1dw’1. 
These correlations therefore reinforce the view that, at least to around 1940, the annual 
AMTR changes were largely associated with changes in the set of non-zero EMTRjs – 
both directly and via the associated change in income weights (due to dt’1dw’1). By 
themselves change in the income weighting (between taxed and untaxed incomes) within 
the AMTR calculation had relatively little impact. After 1940 changes in average non-zero 
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tax rates are still important but other factors (hidden within the residual in equation (8’)) 
appear to be more important. 
The data underlying these correlations can be seen in Figure 9, which plots the annual 
change in the AMTR (right-hand axis) and the unweighted average non-zero EMTRjs (left-
hand axis). This reveals that for many years the EMTRjs remain relatively constant 
(generally because statutory rates are unchanged), while the AMTR changes - because of 
changes to income levels/distribution, changes in thresholds, exemptions etc. 
Nevertheless, many of the largest changes in the AMTR are associated with substantial 
changes in statutory or effective marginal tax rates such as in 1925, 1936, 1940-42, 1946 
and the 1970s. 
Figure 9 – Changes in unweighted averages of EMTRjs and AMTRs, 1922-1983 
 
5 .4  Earned vs.  Unearned Income 
As noted above, throughout the period from 1922 to 1949 a distinction was made between 
earned and unearned income and these were taxed at different rates. Figure 10 shows 
the AMTRs for earned and unearned income, as well as the total AMTR. Up until 1930 the 
tax rate on earned income was reduced by 10% (relative to that for unearned income) for 
the first £2000 of income. During this period the AMTRs for the two types of income 
tracked each other fairly closely, with the AMTR for unearned income generally at 2% to 
5% above that on earned income.  
From 1931 to 1949 the distinction was changed such that the tax on unearned income 
was increased by 33.3% relative to that on earned income. From 1939 the gap between 
the unearned AMTR and earned AMTR begins to increase, reaching its greatest 
divergence in 1945 with a gap of 24 percentage points. This widening gap is due 
exclusively to the changing relative income distributions of earned and unearned income. 
The proportion of unearned income at the top end of the income distribution increased 
dramatically during this period. For example, the proportion of unearned income in the top 
bracket (>£4000) increased from 2% in 1940 to 17% in 1945, while the proportion of 
earned income in this top bracket remained fairly constant at around 1%. 
Unsurprisingly, the overall AMTR is driven mostly by the AMTR for earned income 
reflecting the low share of unearned income in total income. Moreover, this proportion 
decreased substantially over the period, such that the very large AMTRs for unearned 
income in the mid 1940s did not have such a large impact on the overall figure. Unearned 
income made up around 40% of all filers’ income in the early 1920s, but had dropped to 
around 4% by 1949, the last year in which the two were taxed at different rates. Indeed 
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the drop in (declared) unearned income in the 1940s may in part reflect responses to the 
very high marginal tax rates applied to it. 
Figure 10 – AMTRs for earned and unearned income, 1922-1956 
 
From 1950-56 the earned/unearned distinction was no longer relevant for tax purposes, 
but Statistics New Zealand continued to collect the data separately. For this period the 
difference between the two AMTRs – of the order of 5 to 6% - solely reflects the different 
income distribution of earned and unearned income. 
5 .5  The Ef fec t  o f  Fami ly  Tax Credi ts ,  Benef i ts  and ACC 
Family tax credits (FTC) and various other social welfare benefits have operated via the 
tax system in New Zealand since at least the 1970s. These have often involved the 
withdrawal of transfers/benefits in association with increases in individual or family income 
levels, thereby affecting EMTRs of the income tax-transfer system as a whole.20 
Systematically incorporating these withdrawal/abatement effects in our AMTR calculations 
is beyond the scope of our analysis. Indeed it is hard to find suitable descriptions of the 
system, and relevant data, on an annual basis that would allow us to include its AMTR 
impact. 
Table 5 – EMTRjs for family tax credits, welfare benefits and ACC 
 
WFF & Benefit ACC 
EMTRjs Income share EMTRjs Income share 
  0% 90.6%    0% 16.6% 
20% 8.3% 1.3% 83.4% 
30% 0.07%   
70%+ 1.03%   
AMTRs: 1.7% (WFF) 0.7% (Benefits) 1.1% (ACC) 
                                                                
20  For a description of the system as it operated up to 1999, see Leibschutz (1999). 
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However, for 2008, Inland Revenue has examined the effect on individual taxpayers’ 
EMTRjs, and the aggregate AMTR, of the combined FTC, Benefit and ACC (Accident 
Compensation Corporation) systems. Calculating the income-weighted AMTR for income 
taxes, FTC, ACC and Benefits combined yields an AMTR of 34.7% compared to 31.3% 
for income tax only. That is, at the aggregate level the impact of the FTC, welfare benefits 
and ACC on the AMTR is around 3 percentage points. Table 5 reports the EMTRjs for the 
three components and a decomposition of the combined AMTR.  
The table shows EMTRjs for FTC and benefits of 0%, 20%, 30%, and 70% and above, 
with taxpayers facing 0% accounting for the lion’s share of total income but with around 
8% of taxpayers by income-share facing 20% EMTRjs (in addition to their income tax 
MTRj). For ACC, most taxpayers (who account for over 80% of total income) faced the 
1.3% levy in 2008. The final row of Table 5 shows the contributions to the AMTR, with 
FTC adding the largest element to the overall AMTR (1.7%) with a combined 3.4 
percentage points added to the AMTR for income taxes. 
5 .6  Rel iab i l i ty  o f  AMTR Est imates  
It is clear that, with different qualities of data collection likely throughout the 100 year 
period that we are considering, together with differences in the suitability of available data 
for our purposes and our methodologies to analyse them, the reliability of our AMTR 
estimates is also likely to be variable. In general we might expect the reliability of the 
estimates to improve over time. In particular the post 1981 data, being based on Inland 
Revenue unit record data might be expected to be more accurate. Encouragingly, when 
we estimate the three overlap years, 1981-83, using the more aggregative data and 
methods applied in the pre-1981 period, there is a reasonably close match with the IRD 
estimates. This suggests that, at least in the years leading up to 1981, calculation of 
AMTRs from aggregate-level income information is relatively accurate. Similarly, as noted 
earlier, the effect of adjusting the AMTRs using total exemptions data, the accuracy of 
which is unknown, would appear in general to have little impact on year-to-year changes 
in the AMTR. Nevertheless, the omission of a range of social welfare transfer payments 
from our EMTRj and AMTR calculations is likely to be especially important from the 1970s 
onwards when such income-related payments became more prevalent. 
For pre-1922 years we have chosen not to extrapolate back to 1892 or interpolate 
between years of available data because we have no reliable income information on 
which to base them (though we do know the tax schedule). Subsequently, the main 
source of inaccuracy in our annual estimates may be the need to use less frequent 
census and other data to estimate annual non-filer income shares during the period to 
1951; see Appendix 4. These involve a number of simplifying assumptions and rely on 
indirect methods to identify incomes for those who are not recorded in any contemporary 
income database. Further, the introduction in 1959 of the PAYE tax administration system 
probably improved the quality of central recording of taxpayer incomes in aggregate and 
may therefore impact on the reliability of our AMTR estimates. More generally, we have 
no alternative data to apply as a cross-check on the method we use to incorporate the 
impact of tax-exempt income on EMTRjs; namely using the ratio of exemptions to gross 
income as shown in equation (7). However, the impact of this adjustment is generally 
small on the EMTRj estimates compared to those without this adjustment. 
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6  Conc lus ions  
Following the methods proposed by Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986) to calculate an 
‘aggregate’ marginal income tax rate (AMTR), which they applied to US data, this paper 
has adapted the methodology to derive a similar aggregate tax rate measure for New 
Zealand. This involved construction of an income-weighted average of individual-level 
marginal tax rates, having first accounted for various factors that allow effective, rather 
than statutory, marginal tax rates to be estimated. These calculated rates largely avoid the 
endogeneity problems of more commonly used aggregate-level MTRs based on tax 
revenue data.  
We have constructed the AMTR measure for 1907-2009. Our approach to constructing an 
income-weighted AMTRs was largely dictated by data availability – Statistics New 
Zealand income distribution and tax data for 1907-1981 and Inland Revenue taxpayer unit 
record data for 1981-2009 (with a 3 year overlap period, 1981-1983 as a cross-check). 
We combined data on the income tax schedule, taking account of income tax rates, 
thresholds, exemptions etc., with data on the distribution of incomes and exemptions from 
Statistics New Zealand’s Official Yearbook, Report of Incomes and Income Taxes¸ and 
New Zealand Censuses. These sources enabled AMTRs to be calculated for most years 
from 1907-1983, with varying degrees of accuracy. 
The resulting AMTR evidence shows that the nature of the tax schedule has changed 
dramatically over the period, and the contribution of income weighting from different 
income classes of taxpayers has also played a role. The AMTR series reveals that rates 
varied substantially over the whole 1907-2009 period, but with a generally increasing 
trend. Unsurprisingly, the AMTR rose especially during the two World Wars, fell modestly 
in the immediate aftermath of war but soon stabilised, or rose again quickly thereafter. 
After the immediate post-WWII reduction, the AMTR generally rises from around 25% in 
the mid-1940s to around 45% by the early-1980s, with a major interruption when AMTRs 
declined in 1961 and, to a lesser extent, in the early 1970s. From the early 1980s a 
substantial decline in the AMTR occurs, in part associated with the later ’80s reforms, 
reaching under 30% by 1990. The data also confirm the small but sustained rise in the 
AMTR (from 26% in 2000 to 31% in 2008) following the increase in the top rate of 
personal income tax from 33% to 39% in 2000, and the impact of fiscal drag thereafter as 
income tax thresholds remained fixed in nominal terms. 
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Append ix  1 :  The  NZ ‘Mul t i -S lope ’  Income Tax  
Sys tem 1914-1939  
This Appendix describes the so-called ‘multi-slope’ marginal tax rate schedule. This is in 
contrast to the more usual ‘multi-step’ tax schedule in which marginal tax rates rise in 
steps at specified income thresholds and are constant between thresholds, and where 
each MTR applies to additional income above each threshold. The multi-slope tax 
schedule of 1914-39, on the other hand, typically applied to incomes in excess of an initial 
threshold income level but the marginal tax rate specified in the schedule increased with 
every additional pound that an individual earned and each higher rate applied to all 
income (above an initial tax-exempt level of income where applicable), not just the 
increment. 
Below we describe this system using two years to illustrate: 1914 and 1917. The 1917 
case involved two additional features: an additional ‘special war tax’ (1917- 1920) and an 
initial income exemption abated beyond a specified higher level of income. 
A1.1 The 1914 tax  s t ructure 
Let y be taxable income before the exemption, A.  An exemption of 300 pounds applies for 
all taxpayers.  Let τ* be the marginal tax rate specified in the tax schedule as levied on 
assessable income, so that the total tax paid is: 
T = τ*(Y - a) where a = 300 (A1) 
The marginal tax rate, from (A1), is: 
τ = dT/dy = τ* + (y - a)(d τ*/dy) (A2) 
For 300 ≤ y ≤ 400: τ = τ* = 0.025 (6 pence per pound; there are 240 pennies in a pound) 
For incomes above 400, the value of τ* increases by 3/400ths of a penny for each pound 
increase in income. Hence: 
For 400 < y ≤ 1400: 
τ* = 0.025 + (3/400)(1/240)(y-400) 
⇒ τ* = 0.0125 + 0.00003125y (A3) 
Note that τ* = 0.025 at y=400 and τ* = 0.05625 at y=1400. Using (2) and (3) it can be 
shown that: 
τ = 0.003125 + 0.0000625y (A4) 
giving τ = 0.028125 at y=400 and τ = 0.090625 at y=1400. Values of τ for 400 < y < 1400 
are on a straight line between these two points; see Figure 1. 
For 1400 < y ≤  2400, the lower rate of increase in τ* (1/(400*240)) yields: 
τ* = 0.04168 + 0.000010417y (A5) 
such that τ*= 0.05625 at y=1400 and τ*= 0.0667 at y=2400. For this income range, using 
(2) and (5) it can be shown that: 
τ = 0.038552 + 0.000020834y (A6) 
Equation (6) yields: τ = 0.06772 at y=1400 and τ = 0.08855 at y=2400.  Values of τ for y 
between 1400 and 2400 are on a straight line between these two points. Beyond 2400, 
the marginal tax rate is specified as a constant 14 pennies per pound, or 5.83%. 
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This reveals that the EMTR can be higher, and sometimes considerably higher, than τ* 
during the 1914-39 period due to the impact of the multi-slope aspect of the schedule. The 
maximum rate does not generally apply at the highest income levels, where the ‘slope 
aspect’ is absent. The slope is further amplified when there is abatement of the tax-free 
threshold, a1, as occurred during 1917-35.  
Figure A1 also reveals that the EMTR varied between about 2.5% and 9% in 1914 for 
those who were liable to pay tax and file tax returns. Most income earners did not earn 
sufficient income to exceed the tax-free threshold in this period – by our estimates (see 
below) only around 10% of employees were tax filers and not all of those were assessed 
as tax-liable (for example, if their assessable income fell below £300). Hence, when 
weighted by taxpayer incomes (see section 5), the average ‘effective’ marginal tax rate 
across tax filers was around 5% in 1914, but for all income earners combined it was only 
around 0.5%. 
Figure A1 – Marginal and average tax rates in the 1914 tax structure 
 
 
A1.2 The 1917 ‘war- t ime’  tax  s t ruc ture 
The tax structure described above also applied in 1917, with an exemption of £300 
available to all taxpayers with incomes below £600. Thereafter the exemption was 
withdrawn at a rate of £1 each additional £1 earned; i.e. the exemption is zero for incomes 
above 900. (For other years there were different withdrawal regimes, sometimes involving 
more than one withdrawal or abatement rate). 
The marginal tax rate, from (1), now needs to reflect that d(y – a) ≠ dy, hence: 
τ = dT/dy = τ*(d(y – a)/dy) + (y - a)(dτ*/dy) (A7) 
Allowing for the abatement range of incomes (600 to 900), this gives: 
 τ = τ* + (y – a)(dτ*/dy) y ≤ 600 where d(y – a)/dy = 1 
 τ = 2τ* + (y – a)(dτ*/dy) 600 < y ≤ 900  where d(y – a)/dy = 2 (A8) 
 τ = τ* + y(dτ*/dy) y > 900 where a = 0; d(y – a)/dy = 1 
For 300 ≤ y ≤ 400, the tax schedule specified a tax rate of 6 pence per pound (0.025) plus 
a ‘war tax’ rate of 9 pence (0.0375). The combined marginal tax rate is given by: 
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τ = τ* = 0.0625 (6+9 pence per pound) 
For 400 ≤ y ≤ 600, the 6 pence per pound tax rate is increased by 1/200th of a penny per 
pound and the special war tax rate is increased at 3/400ths of a penny per pound. This 
gives: 
τ* = 0.041667 + 0.000052083y (A9) 
yielding: τ* = 0.0625 at y = 400, and τ* = 0.0729 at y = 600. Using (A2) and (A9) it can be 
shown that τ = 0.02604 + 0.00010417Y, and hence τ = 0.0677 at y = 400, and τ = 
0.0885 at y = 600. 
For 600 ≤ y ≤ 900, the abatement of the £300 exemption begins; therefore using (A8) and 
the previous definition of τ* yields: 
 τ = 0.03646 + 0.00020833Y (A10) 
In this case: τ* = 0.0729 and τ = 0.1615 at y = 600, while τ* = 0.0885 and τ = 0.2237 at y 
= 900. 
For 900 ≤ y ≤ 6,400, τ* is given by the last line of (A8) such that, with no exemptions, 
τ = 0.1354 at y = 900 and τ = 0.7083 at y = 6,400. Thereafter, for incomes in excess of 
6400 there is no longer any increase in τ* as incomes increase, That is, d τ*/dy = 0 and 
this element of the MTR calculation in drops out. The marginal tax rate is now simply τ = 
τ* = 0.375, implying a large drop in the MTR at y = 6,400 (from 70.8% to 37.5%) which 
remains constant at higher income levels; see Figures A1a and A1b. 
 
Figure A2 – Marginal and average tax rates in the 1917 tax structure 
A2(a) Individual incomes up to £1200 
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A2(b) Individual incomes up to £7000 
 
Append ix  2 :  Income D is t r ibu t ion  Data  
The income distribution data used in this paper have been sourced from hard copies of 
various editions of the NZ Official Yearbooks and related Statistics New Zealand 
publications. Available income and tax data vary in quality and coverage over the period 
of the personal income tax. There is no income data prior to 1907; thereafter we describe 
the available data according to different sub-periods. 
1907 -1924  (Source:  NZ  Of f i c ia l  Year books )  
Data in this period are only available for the 1907, 1910, 1912, 1915, 1917, 1920, and 
1922-24 income years.  The data represent assessable income gathered from tax 
assessments filed with Inland Revenue. The 1915 and 1923 NZOYBs provide a 
decomposition of total income (for 1907, 1910, 1912, 1915, 1917, 1920) by salaried 
persons, persons and firms, registered companies, non-resident traders and professional 
men. We have combined income distribution data for those groups excluding registered 
companies to measure personal income. 
As noted in the NZOYBs of the early 1920s: “No complete statistics of annual income are 
available for New Zealand, nor has any official investigation of the total income of the 
Domain been attempted” (NZOYB, 1925, p.699). Nevertheless, income data based on tax 
returns filed with Inland Revenue were published in the NZOYB. These return data, 
particularly in the early 20th century, understate total income because, for many income 
earners, low income exemptions meant that many taxpayers were excluded from filing tax 
returns. We have addressed this issue by attempting to estimate non-filer income using 
long-term labour market data, census data on income and aggregate national income 
statistics; see below and Appendix 4 for details. 
1925  –  1931  (NZ Of f i c ia l  Year books)  
From 1925 the NZOYB decomposes income into four taxpayer classes (and 10 different 
sources of income): Class I. Persons and firms (i.e. individuals); Class II. Companies; 
Class III. Agents of debenture holders; and Class IV. Non-resident traders. Importantly, 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
MTR 1917
ATR 1917
  
3 5   
data on the distribution of Class I gross assessable income, by income class size, is 
available, including similar distributions of earned income and exemptions. Earned income 
below a given threshold (£2000 in 1929), was taxed at a lower rate compared to unearned 
income through the first half of the 20th century. In addition, certain income was exempt 
from tax depending on a taxpayer’s circumstances. Data on tax exemptions distributed by 
size of income, first appeared in the NZOYB in this period; they are described further in 
Appendix 3. 
1932  –  1933  (Source :  Es t i ma ted)  
Data are not available over these two years and it was noted that ‘reasons of economy’ 
prevented the data from being collected. We have filled in the missing total and earned 
income distributions by applying linear interpolation to the income share of each income 
bracket from the years either side of the missing observations. 
1934  –  1941  (Source :  NZ  Of f ic ia l  Year books)  
The data discussed above for 1925-1931 are available throughout most of this period.  
Changes to tax laws in the early 1930s meant individuals with incomes above £200 
(formerly £300) were required to file tax returns. As a result it is expected that the NZOYB 
data would capture a larger number of individuals who formerly were not captured. 
However, a large increase in assessable income of low income taxpayers, that might have 
been expected, did not eventuate; it may be that the depression pushed many below the 
£200 income level.  From 1935 the recorded income of low income taxpayers did start to 
rise significantly.21 
1942  –  1945  (Source :  Es t i ma ted)  
Data are not available - the NZOYB was not compiled because of labour shortages in 
WWII. We have again applied linear interpolation of income shares to estimate the 
missing years. 
1946  –  1960  (Source :  NZ  Of f ic ia l  Year books)  
Individual taxpayer data are available through this period. From 1949 the compilation of 
statistics was changed from a population of income assessments to a 10% sample, but a 
full enumeration of assessments for incomes above £2,500. Certain types of non-
assessable (and hence non-taxable) income, such as war pensions and social security 
benefits, were not captured in the NZOYB income data. All individuals whose income 
exceeded £200 were required to file a tax return. Our estimates of non-filer income 
suggests that by the early 1950s only a small proportion of total taxable income was not 
being captured by income filed with Inland Revenue; the introduction of Pay-As-You-Earn 
(PAYE) source-based taxation in 1958 rendered the filer/non-filer distinction redundant for 
our purposes.22 
                                                                
21  From 1938, individual and company tax data are presented in separate subsections within the NZOYB.  As a result, any indirect 
capture of company income in previous data (for instance through exemptions) is eliminated, though this is not expected to be 
significant. 
22  The PAYE system, introduced on 1 April 1958, led to a disruption in the collection of 1958 income year data. Taxpayers solely 
earning salary and wage income did not have to furnish a tax return for income under £1,040. As a result, income data for the 
1958 income year may under represent low income earners. 
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1961  –  1984  (Source :  NZ  Of f ic ia l  Year books  to  1971;  Repor t  o f  
I ncome s and Income  Tax ,  1972 -84)  
Previously discussed income data are available throughout this period (except data for 
1962 were never published - we have again applied linear interpolation). Also, in 1967 
New Zealand implemented a decimal (Dollar) currency system (set at $2 = £1), but 
income data presented in decimal form are available in the NZOYB from 1962.23 
Append ix  3 :  Exempt ions  Data   
Exemptions of certain income from tax were an important feature of the New Zealand 
personal income tax system up until the 1970s. A portion of income was exempt from tax 
for a specified set of circumstances. These included:24  
• General personal exemption: The first New Zealand income tax exempted the first 
£300 of income. The level of the general exemption subsequently varied between 
£200 and £468.  
• Dependent wife/husband exemption: Introduced in 1933, the dependent spouse 
exemption ranged from £50 in 1933-45 to a maximum of £200 in 1960. The exemption 
was abated against both spouses’ incomes, andwas in place until at least 1967.  
• Child/dependent exemption: Allowances for dependent children were first introduced 
into the Land and Income Assessment Amendment Act 1913. An exemption of £25 for 
each child under 16 applied, subject to a household income limit of £425. The rate was 
increased to £50 per child and the age limit increased to 18 from 1922. 
• Housekeeper exemption: From 1933 an exemption applied to widows and widowers 
(later divorcees and unmarried people) with dependent children. The exemption 
ranged from a maximum of £50 to a maximum of £200. 
• Life insurance exemption: An exemption was given on life insurance premiums in the 
Land and Income Assessment Act 1891. Premiums were tax deductable up to £50. 
Contributions to National Provident Fund, superannuation and insurance funds were 
also tax deductable. 
The general exemption was the most significant exemption. Initially, the exemption 
applied to all taxpayers, but from 1917 until 1935 it abated such that it only applied to 
incomes below a certain level. From 1936 it applied to all income earners again. Other 
exemptions were also dependent on income and were abated as income increased. 
However, we have only been able to account for the impact that abatement of the general 
exemption had on EMTRjs. Table A1 below sets out the abatement regimes which applied 
from 1917 to 1935. 
From the early-mid 1920s, NZOYBs provide data on the total value of exemptions claimed 
by size of assessable income, by exemption category, captured via income tax returns 
filed with Inland Revenue. In the 1920s, exemption data were presented as an aggregate 
across all classes of taxpayer, but in general exemptions only applied to the incomes of 
Class I taxpayers (individuals). An exception was an exemption of 5% on the capital value 
                                                                
23  The Report on Income and Income Tax was not produced for the 1975 and 1977 years.  For those years we have used 
provisional income tax data (salary and wage, self-employed persons and investment income) available from the NZOYBs. 
24  At various times during the sample period, other forms of income, were entirely exempt from tax such as war pensions or social 
welfare benefits. Because those forms of income were non-assessable they are not captured in our tax-return based data, and are 
therefore not included in our exemption adjustments for the AMTR calculations. 
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of unimproved value of land from which income was derived, and which also applied to 
certain registered companies. 
Table A1 – Abatement of general exemption, 1917-1935 
Period Abatement regime 
1917 – 26 y ≤ £600: £300 exemption 
£600 < y < £900: exemption withdrawn at £1 per £1 over £600 
y ≥ £900: no exemption 
1927 – 30 y ≤ £450: £300 exemption 
£450 < y < £750: exemption withdrawn at £1 per £2 over £450 
£750 < y < £900: £150 exemption, reduced by £1 per £1 over £750 
y ≥ £900: no exemption 
1931 – 32 y ≤ £260: £260 exemption 
£261 < y < £560: exemption withdrawn at £1 per £3 over £260 
£560 < y < £800: exemption of £160, reduced by £1 per £1 10s. over £560 
Y ≥ £800: no exemption 
1933 - 35 As above with £50 deducted from the exemption ascertained 
 
Table A2 shows the common form of aggregate exemption data presented in the NZOYB 
for the 1925/26 income year. It shows that the general exemption made up the majority of 
exemptions and was predominantly received by low income earners (since the exemption 
was abated with income). With the exception of land value exemptions, other exemptions 
also appear to be claimed mainly be those with incomes below £1000. 
Table A2 – Exemptions by size of income for the 1925/26 income year 
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Data presented in the NZOYB are ‘effective exemptions’. That is, where the exemption 
amount exceeded assessable income, the allowable exemptions were reduced 
accordingly. From 1935 the distribution of exemptions by size of income were presented 
as an average per £100 and from 1948 exemptions distribution data are again presented 
as total exemptions claimed rather than as averages. 
Append ix  4 :  Es t imat i ng  Non- f i l e rs ’  Incomes  
An important issue in the measurement of AMTRs is the inability of tax-return-based data 
in the NZOYBs to capture the incomes of those not required to furnish tax returns – 
expected to be significant for low income earners during the early part of the 20th century.  
This Appendix briefly outlines how we quantify the size of income of non filers not 
adequately captured by NZOYB data. This provides suitable income weights to attach to 
those income earners who effectively face a zero personal income tax rate. 
The approach used to estimate non-filer income follows three stages. 
1. Estimate the number of potential non-filers 
The total number of employees, from the long term data file at the Statistics New 
Zealand’s (SNZ) website,25 was used as a proxy for the total number of individual income 
earners. The number of individual taxpayers from the NZOYB was subtracted from total 
employees to produce an estimate of the total number of non filers. 
2. Estimate the average annual income of non-filers 
A distribution of the population by income, from NZ censuses, was used to estimate the 
average annual income level of non filers – which are predominantly low income earners. 
The 1926 census was the first to include a question on incomes, and we were able to 
source a count of the population by income from that census onwards.  Through the first 
half of the 20th century in New Zealand, income tax returns were not required to be 
completed for those earning under a certain income (£300 in 1926).  Fortunately, census 
data on income over this period focused on ranges of income that were close to this low 
income exemption.  For instance, the 1926 census asked respondents to indicate their 
annual income from the following ranges. 
 
No income < £52 £52 - £155 £156 - £207 £208 - £311 £312 - £363 > £363 
 
Aggregate tables by income and age were obtained for the 1926, 1936, 1945 and 1951 
censuses.  From the aggregate tables, we ignored those under the age of 16 and those 
who indicated they did not earn any income i.e. we aimed to count only those most likely 
to be making work and investment decisions.  Furthermore, for the purpose of estimating 
the average income of non-filers, people earning over the low income exemption were 
also excluded in our calculation. The weighted average income of non-filers was 
estimated by multiplying the mid-point of each income bracket (deemed to include non-
filers) by the corresponding weight each selected bracket contributed to the total of the 
selected population.  Table A3 presents our estimated average income of non-filers from 
the 1926 census and the corresponding weights used to derive it. 
                                                                
25  Long-term labour market statistics can be found here: http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/National 
Accounts/long-term-data-series/labour-market.aspx 
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Table A3 – Estimated average income of non-filers from 1926 census data 
Income bracket Under £52 £52 to £155 £156 to £207 £208 to £311 
Weight of selected population 
by income bracket 11.3% 38.3% 20.1% 30.2% 
Midpoint £26.00 £103.50 £181.50 £259.50 
Weighted average income £158 
3. Calculate total income of non-filers 
The estimated average income above was multiplied by the estimated number of non-
filers, giving total income generated by non-filers.  This total income can then be used to 
increase the weight associated with the lowest income group’s contribution to the AMTR 
calculation. However, as noted in the NZOYB, some low-income earners, despite not 
being required to file a tax return, still furnished returns and were captured in the NZOYB 
income data. As a result, the income recorded in the NZOYB under the lowest income 
bracket was subtracted from our estimated total non-filer assessable income to avoid any 
double counting. 
Table A4 outlines the process of calculating total assessable income of non-filers.  
Unsurprisingly, the estimated number of non-filers, and in turn income, was considerable 
in 1926. As income rose over time in general, a smaller number of taxpayers fell into the 
non-filer group leading to a lower amount of non-filer income. 
Table A4 – Estimated non-filer income 
 
To estimate non-filers in years between censuses we follow the approach of Barro and 
Sahasakul (1983) who suggest that the proportion of non-filer income to total income 
fluctuated during different economic conditions, such as the depression in the 1930s. 
They show, as expected, that there is a higher proportion of non-filer to total income 
during the depression for the U.S. (Barro and Sahasakul, 1983, Table 1), while the 
proportion decreased in years of greater prosperity during the 1920s. Barro-Sahasakul 
also use the ratio of personal income to nominal GNP to estimate the relevant no-filer to 
filer income ratio for earlier years. 
We follow the same approach here and extend estimates based on census years. Using 
our estimates for non-filer incomes in 1926, 1936, 1945, and 1951, aggregated personal 
income is found by adding the non-filers adjustment to total (filers’) assessable income. 
Using the ratio of this total personal income to GNP for the four census years, we extend 
this ratio linearly to fill in all other years. Personal income for missing years is then found 
by multiplying this ratio with annual GNP. Finally non-filer income is obtained by 
subtracting the assessable from the total personal income. 
The above approach (using the personal income to GDP ratio) produces a generally 
increasing ratio of filer to total assessable income from 1926 to 1951 (0.347, 0.707, 0.919, 
0.963). However between 1945 and 1951, this produces an estimated negative amount of 
non-filer income in some intervening years. To interpolate between 1945-51 we therefore 
interpolate linearly between the filers/total income ratios of 0.919 and 0.963. From 1958 
Income year Tax payers Number 
employed
Estimated non filers Estimated average 
income of non filers
Estimated total 
income of non filers
Assessable income 
within non filer 
income bracket
Additional 
income for 
AMTR 
calculation
(A)  (B) (C)=(B)-(A)  (D) (E)=(C)×(D) (F) (G)=(E)-(F)
1926 43,910 563,718 519,808 £158 £81,931,267 £4,162,525 £77,768,742
1936 80,530 587,712 507,182 £84 £42,818,313 £20,118,237 £22,700,076
1945 310,926 628,471 317,545 £101 £31,945,578 £25,217,000 £6,728,578
1951 452,890 730,868 277,978 £96 £26,632,198 £15,790,000 £10,842,198
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the introduction of PAYE taxation renders the non-filers adjustments unnecessary for 
subsequent years. 
While this approach undoubtedly involved various inaccuracy (of unknown magnitude) it is 
likely to be more accurate as a method of filling in missing years between the census, and 
before 1926, than taking simple linearly interpolated averages. The resulting time-series 
for the ratio of filers-to-total personal income and the breakdown of filer and non-filer 
incomes are given in Figures A2 and A3 respectively. 
Figure A3 – Ratio of filers-to-total personal incomes, 1907-1958 
 
 
Figure A4 – Decomposition of total personal income into filers/non-filers, 1907-1958 
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